Perguntas que Brad de Long gostaria de fazer a Condoleezza Rice

Q: You stated that the proposals for attacking Al Qaeda that Richard Clarke submitted to you in January 2001 were a "laundry list," and that it took eight months of work to turn that "laundry list" into a coherent plan. Isn't that claim false? Wasn't the plan the NSC Principals discussed on September 4 in its essentials the same plan that Richard Clarke had proposed on January 25?

Follow Up Q: In retrospect, don't you deeply regret that you did not give Richard Clarke the NSC Principals meeting he asked for at the very start of the administration?

Follow Up Q: Why have you worked so hard to exaggerate the differences between what Clarke proposed on January 25 and what the NSC Principals discussed on September 4?

Q: Do you regret requiring that Richard Clarke report to the NSC Deputies committee rather than chairing the NSC Principals committee? Didn't this greatly slow down policy development? Wouldn't things have been better if you had let Clarke do what he wanted to do--play the same role he played in the Clinton administration?

Follow Up Q: What benefit was gained from forcing Richard Clarke to jump through bureaucratic hoops set for him by people like Wolfowitz who believed that Saddam Hussein was a much more important foreign policy concern than Osama bin Laden?

Q: You have stated that in the summer of 2001 the Bush administration was at "battle stations". When the Clinton administration was at battle stations in the run-up to January 1, 2000, the NSC staff led by Richard Clarke shook the trees by having daily cabinet-level meetings on the terrorist threat, and demanding that cabinet officers probe deeply into their organizations looking for important but unrecognized information. There was no corresponding effort in the summer of 2001, was there?

Follow Up Q: When you say that the Bush administration was at "battle stations" before 911, aren't you misleading people who know what Richard Clarke's idea of "battle stations" is?

Follow Up Q: Do you regret not giving Richard Clarke the authority in the summer of 2001 to do what he wanted to do--to "shake the trees" of the departments in an attempt to uncover information of unrecognized importance?

Q: Richard Cheney has claimed that before September 11, 2001, Richard Clarke was "out of the loop" on important counterterrorism matters. What important matters relevant to counterterrorism was Richard Clarke--the administration's counterterrorism coordinator--not informed of before September 11?

Follow Up Q: Whose policy decision was it that the counterterrorism coordinator would not be allowed to coordinate--would not be informed of--important aspects of counterterrorism?

Follow Up Q: [If Rice backs Cheney] Wasn't this keeping the counterterrorism coordinator from having the information he needed to do his job a really stupid idea?

Follow Up Q: [If Rice contradicts Cheney] So you are saying that Richard Cheney is not trustworthy?

Q: Richard Clarke's counterterrorism proposals were taken to the NSC Principals on September 4, 2001. But isn't it correct that there was no agreement on how to fund Clarke's proposals reached at that meeting?

Follow Up Q: When--if 9/11 had not happened--would the next NSC Principals' meeting on this issue have been scheduled?

Q: In May 2001, George W. Bush asked for a plan to destroy Al Qaeda. Richard Clarke told you he could have such a plan ready on two days. Was there any reason not to rapidly satisfy Bush's request?

Q: Why does George W. Bush believe that Saddam Hussein played a role in the attacks of September 11, 2001?

Follow Up Q: Did you attempt to disabuse George W. Bush of this belief?

Follow Up Q: Why not?

Q: George W. Bush's belief that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 911 has had important consequences. In early 2002, to prepare for the war in Iraq, important elite American combat units were withdrawn from Afghanistan. Didn't this have a significant impact retarding out hunt for members of Al Qaeda?

Follow Up Q: If these units weren't important, why were they sent to Afghanistan in the first place?

Follow Up Q: Aren't the steps we are taking now along the Afghan-Pakistan border steps that we should have taken in the spring of 2002--steps that we would have taken in spring 2002 if not for the administration's focus on Iraq?